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This thesis includes two essays on China’s economy and financial markets. 
Essay 1 examines the impact of state ownership of borrowers on the finance-
growth nexus in China. Using a sample of 31 provinces from 2004 to 2013, I find 
that the growth effect of bank deepening is more evident with a larger fraction of 
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) while Non-State-Owned Enterprises (NSOEs) 
contribute to economic growth with the expansion of equity market. The results 
may result from the mismatch of maturity between short-term bank loans and 
long-term innovation activities for NSOEs. Based on the World Bank Enterprise 
Surveys database, I collect survey data of 2838 private firms and find that, 
compared with NSOEs, SOEs allocate more resource in R&D sector if they have 
access to bank loans. Using R&D expenditure data of 8150 public firms, I find 
that for non-state-owned public firms, which do not suffer from the maturity 
mismatch problem, the marginal effect of the financial deepening on firm 
innovation is positive and the results are significant for both bank financing and 
equity financing. The evidence suggests that if NSOEs can get rid of the problem 
of maturity mismatch, lending to these firms will promote innovation and thereby 
boost economic growth. 
Essay 2 examines the impact of funding liquidity on market liquidity by using a 
nature experiment in Chinese stock market in April 2015 when China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) decides to restrict Off-market margin trading. 
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With the exogenous decline in funding liquidity, the stocks those are not included 
in the official margin trading list experience a larger decline in market liquidity. I 
ﬁnd similar results within the Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) which attract 
most of the positions of investors trading with Off-market margin. My results also 
reveal that the commonality in liquidity within the Off-market margin stocks 
increases with the negative shocks to Off-market margin trading, while the change 
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Chapter 1: Financial Deepening, Firm Innovation and Economic Growth in 
China: The Role of State Ownership 
1.1 Introduction 
In the past three decades, China has experienced great economic growth along 
with rapid expansion of its financial sector. The M2/GDP ratio, an index of 
financial deepening, was 194.5% in 2013, seven times higher than that in 1977, 
while the GDP per capita has grown from 182.7 US$ to 6807.4 US$ during the 
same period.  
In traditional theory, financial development could boost economic growth by 
improving the allocation of resources, identifying highly productive projects and 
supporting entrepreneurial start-up as well as innovation activities (see, e.g., Boyd 
and Smith (1992); Aghion, Howitt and Mayer (2005); Allen (1990); Blackburn 
and Hung (1998); Galetovic (1996); Greenwood and Jovanovic (1989); King and 
Levine (1993); Morales (2003)).  
Hence, much effort has been made to identify the growth effect of financial 
development in China. Prior studies on the topic have had differing conclusions. 
While some researchers find empirical evidence that China’s financial 
development does indeed spur the economic growth (Zhang, Wang and Wang, 
2012), others take the position that the effect of financial deepening on economic 
growth is either negative or insignificant (Boyreau-Debray(2003)); Guariglia and 
Poncet (2008); Hasan, Wachtel and Zhou (2009)).  
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To explain the weak evidence of finance-growth nexus China, one strand of prior 
research suggests that State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are the impediment to the 
channel of finance and economic growth. State-Owned Enterprises, which play a 
dominant role in China’s economy, control more than 2/3 of industrial capital and 
bank loans of China (Allen, Qian and Qian (2005)). However, compared with 
Non-State-Owned enterprises (NSOEs), SOEs are inefficient and less productive 
(Firth, Fung and Rui (2006); Lin et al. (2011)) but they still obtain much more 
support from the Chinese government. Allen, Qian and Qian (2005) suggest that 
the annual growth rate of the Non-State sector is about 3 times as much as that of 
the State sector while most of the bank credit is granted to State sector, while the 
Non-State sector utilizes relationship and reputation as substitutes for external 
financing. Therefore, some scholars argue that lending to SOEs is not efficient 
and thus has a negative impact on the finance-growth nexus in China. However, if 
lending to SOEs is inefficient, why do the banks, which are controlled by the 
Chinese government, prefer to SOEs rather than NSOEs that are able to provide 
more profitable and less risky projects? Is there any social benefit for banks’ 
lending to SOEs? Whether the benefits of lending to SOEs outweigh the cost and 
in turn spur economic growth in China? 
To answer these questions, we should first understand the financial system in 
China. The financial system is dominated by the banking sector where the impact 
of the supply side is much more significant than the demand. Since most of the 
firms in China are highly constrained by the undeveloped financial market, the 
investment and innovation activities solely depend on the supply of bank loans. In 
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other words, without the support of a bank, the firm may not be able to invest in 
the projects that can increase the productivity and create great net present value. 
Moreover, when the firm makes the decision of its investment policy, it would not 
only take into account the current credit they get from the banks but also consider 
whether they can get bank supply when the current loans mature. For example, a 
financially constrained firm has an opportunity to introduce a new product line 
that will largely increase the productivity and thereby bring positive NPV. 
Suppose the total cost of the project is 1 million dollars and the net present value 
is 2 million dollars. The firm can finance the project by bank loans but it will take 
5 years to recover the cash (1 million dollars) invested in the new product line.  If 
the firm is able to get bank loans with a maturity of 5 years, it will definitely 
invest in the project. However, if the firm only gets support from banks with 
short-term loans that mature within 3 years, it may give up the valuable 
investment opportunity due to the rollover risk. In other words, the short maturity 
debt would lead to a potential rollover risk that impedes long-term investment and 
innovation activities (Diamond (1991)). 
Figure 1.1 presents the proportion of short-term loans of the "big four" state-
owned commercial banks in China. As shown in the figure, all of the four banks 
hold at least 30% loans with a maturity period less than one year and the short-
term loans account for about 42% of the total loans of Agricultural Bank of China, 
suggesting a high supply of short-term funds of the banks in China.  
 Figure 1.2 shows the proportion of debt issued in China’s bond market. Basically, 
there are two bond market in China, exchange bond market and interbank bond 
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market. As the name implies, the main participants trading in the interbank bond 
market are commercial banks. Individual investors are not allowed to trade in the 
interbank bond market but they have access to the exchange bond market. 
However, Chinese government forbids banks from trading in the exchange bond 
market. Therefore, the variation of participants in the interbank market and 
exchange market provide a benchmark to gauge whether banks has a preference 
for short-term debts. I collect the debt issuance data in 2015 for both markets and 
divide the data into 11 groups by maturity. As shown in figure 1.2, more than 60% 
of the debt has a maturity less than 1 year in the interbank bond market while the 
proportion in exchange bond market is less than 1%. I also find that the bonds 
with a maturity period less than 3 years account for about 80% of the total bonds 
in the interbank bond market, while the number of exchange bond market is only 
20%. Therefore, the distribution of bonds maturity across the two markets, 
combining with the proportion of short-term loans of the "big four" banks, 
indicating that bank financing in China, compared with equity financing, relies 
heavily on short-term loans. 
Since most of the bank loans mature in the short-term, the rollover risk plays a 
significant role in the finance-growth nexus in China. However, SOEs in China 
suffer much less from the problem because SOEs get lots of supports from 
government. Lending to SOEs can reduce the risk under the government 
guarantees and SOEs have a priority to get bank credit. Therefore, banks usually 
regard SOEs credit as safety asset and the loans may flow from NSOEs to SOEs 
under a tight monetary policy or in a slowdown in economic activity, giving rise 
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to a risk of liquidity crunch for NSOEs. Such risk will further lead to a problem of 
maturity mismatch for NSOEs that acquire debt financing through short-term 
loans and allocate the funds to long-term projects such as innovation and research 
activities that are not able to provide cash flows in the short-term. Namely, these 
NSOEs face a high risk of bankruptcy if they cannot get new loans to repay the 
old one. This mismatch problem is evident in China as the financial system is 
dominated by the banking sector and bank financing in China, compared with 
equity financing, relies heavily on short-term loans. 
The mismatch between short-term loans and long-term investment may not cause 
problems in a frictionless market, but it is indeed a big trouble in China where the 
monetary policy changes both dramatically and frequently. In other words, when 
the central bank reduces the money supply, the commercial banks in China will 
support the SOEs first while the NSOEs may suffer from the liquidity crunch. 
Therefore, when NSOEs get loans from banks, they may not allocate the 
resources to innovation and research activities but instead keep the money as 
precautionary savings while SOEs can invest in those long-term projects and 
finally boost economic growth. 
With a sample of 31 provinces from 2004 to 2013, I examine whether the benefits 
of lending to SOEs could enhance the growth effect of financial deepening in 
China. The empirical evidence reveals that the bank deepening indicator, bank 
loan to GDP ratio, is negatively associated with annual GDP growth rate, while 
the marginal effect on the SOEs is positive and significant. Namely, the growth 
effect of bank loans on GDP is more evident with a larger fraction of State sector. 
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To further verify my hypothesis that the mismatch between short-term bank loans 
and long-term innovation activities hinder the finance-growth nexus in China, I 
collect equity issuance data of Non-financial corporations for each province and 
take the ratio of equity issuance to GDP as the equity deepening measure. With 
the new equity financing indicator, the regression results suggest a different story. 
Compared with the bank loans, equity financing has a positive and significant 
impact on income growth while the marginal effect of the State sector is negative. 
In other words, income grows with the expansion of equity market and grows 
faster with a larger Non-State sector.  
Although the relationship between long-run economic growth and finance 
development has been discussed extensively (see e.g., Levine and Zervos (1998); 
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004); Berger, Hasan and Klapper (2004); 
Benhabib and Spiegel (2000); Rioja and Valev (2004); Rousseau and Wachtel 
(1998)), most of the studies fail to explain how financial deepening is associated 
with a higher growth rate. Solow (1957) argues that instead of capital 
accumulation and labor force growth, technological progress is the only factor 
that contributes to per capital growth in the long-run. Aghion, Howitt and Mayer 
(2005) illustrate that financial development accelerates the convergence rate in 
developing countries by encouraging technology transfer and R&D investment. 
Using firm-level data across 47 emerging countries, Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt 




Therefore, I investigate, especially for SOEs, the channel through which the 
financial deepening affects economic growth in China. I manually collect the 
annual domestic grants for patents of each province in China from the state 
intellectual property office of the P.R.C. The impact of the state ownership on the 
finance-innovation association is consistent with that on the finance-growth nexus. 
The results reveal a positive relation between patents grants and equity financing, 
which is more evident with a large size of Non-State sector. But the effects of 
bank loans on innovation are significant and positive with a high fraction of State 
sector.   
To gauge the causal effect of financial deepening on innovation activities, I 
introduce firm-level innovation data for public firms listed in Chinese stock 
market. The maturity mismatch problem is evident for private firms, which are 
financially constrained and relies heavily on bank loans. However, for the less 
financially constrained public firms, the rollover risk is low so I expect to find a 
strong finance-growth nexus. Namely, when the short-term loans mature, public 
firms can easily repay the debt since they can either issue new equities in the 
stock market or pledge the shares of stock as collateral to get new loans. In other 
words, public firms do not suffer from the liquidity crunch caused by the 
mismatch of maturity. Therefore, I expect that, for public firms, NSOEs will 
allocate more resources to research and development activities with the 
development of both bank financing and equity financing. To verify my 
hypothesis, I collect research and development expenditure data of public firms 
from 2006 to 2013 and investigate the impact of state ownership on the relation 
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between finance deepening and R&D expenditure. To alleviate the concern of 
endogeneity, I use the data at the provincial level, rather than firm-level, to 
measure the level of bank deepening and equity deepening. I find that the 
marginal effect of the financial deepening on the firm innovation is positive for 
non-state-owned public firms and the results are significant for both bank 
financing and equity financing. The evidence suggests that if NSOEs can get rid 
of the problem of maturity mismatch, lending to these firms will promote 
economic growth since these productive NSOEs are willing to allocate the loans 
to innovation and research activities. 
My research makes two main contributions to the extant literature. First, to gauge 
the role of SOEs in the real economy and financial deepening, I use provincial 
level data to find out whether and how SOEs affect the finance-growth nexus in 
China, providing a better understanding of the inconclusive results in the prior 
research. Second, using firm-level data, I empirically test the channel through 
which SOEs affect the finance-growth nexus in China. In other words, I 
investigate whether SOEs are more willing to innovate with access to bankloans. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 1.2 describes the data. In 
section 1.3, I develop the empirical models. Section 1.4 presents the results. I 
conclude in Section 1.5. 
1.2 Data 
To investigate the finance-growth nexus in China, I first collect provincial level 
data over 2004 to 2013 across 31 provinces from CEIC database. Following 
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Boyreau-Debray (2003), I take the bank loan to GDP ratio as the proxy of 
financial deepening in each province. To measure SOE, I divide the number of 
industrial State-Owned Enterprises by the total number of industrial enterprises
1
 
in each province. I make use of the Consumer Price Index to gauge the annual 
inflation rate of each province. Besides, I also calculate the fraction of college 
students in the total population to control for education level. 
I collect survey data of more than 2000 private firms, which are financially 
constrained and suffer from the problem of maturity mismatch in China from 
World Bank Enterprise Surveys database to gauge whether the state ownership 
will increase innovation with access to bank loans for private firms. 
Using WIND database, I collect research and development expenditure data of 
public firms from to investigate the impact of state ownership on the relation 
between finance deepening and R&D expenditure. The data is not available 
before 2006 so I only collect the R&D expenditure from 2006 to 2013, including 
8150 public firms across 28 industries. 
Table 1.1 presents the summary statistics of the variables. Lnpgdp is the log of 
GDP per capita of province i in year t. Lnpatents is the annual growth rate of  the 
domestic grants for patents.  Soe denotes the share of SOEs in province i, which is 
measured by the number of industrial state control enterprise divided by the total 
number of industrial enterprise. Bankloan is the bank loan to GDP ratio in each 
province. Equity denotes the equity issuance to GDP ratio. Cpi is the annual 
                                                          
1
I collect the data from Chinese Industrial Enterprises Databasewhich incorporates the industrial 
enterprises whose annual sale is above 5,000,000RMB in each province. The total production 
quantity of those enterprises accounts for 95% of Chinese industrial production quantity. 
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inflation rate of province i in year t. Edu is the level of education measured by the 
number of people with bachelor degree divided by the total population for each 
province. 
Panel B presents the summary statistics of the firm-level data. Innodummy is a 
dummy that values one if the private firm introduced any new products or 
services. Rddummy equals to 1 if the firm spends on research and development 
activities. TotalInn, the sum of the innovation activities conducted by the firm, 
values between 0 to 8. Bankloan equals to 1 if the firm has a line of credit or a 
loan from a financial institution. World Bank Enterprise Surveys database also 
provide the share of the private firm owned by government or state, which is 
denoted by Soe_private. Age is the year of the survey minus the year of 
establishment. Size takes values between 1 to 3, representing small firms, medium 
firms and large firms, respectively. Establishment is the number of establishments 
that form the firm. Incorporate values 1if the firm is legally incorporated. 
Capacity is the output produced as a proportion of the maximum output when 
using all the resources available. For the public firm sample, Rd denotes the log of 
R&D expenditure. Soe_public values 1 if the controlling shareholder of the public 
firm is the state, which is provided by WIND database. 
1.3 Model 
1.3.1 SOEs, Economic growth and Financial Deepening 
To test the hypothesis that finance-growth nexus is positively associated with the 
fraction of the State-Owned Enterprises. I develop the following panel regression: 
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∆lnPGDP𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼lnPGDP𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝛽SOE𝑖,𝑡Bankloan𝑖 ,𝑡  +  𝜆SOE𝑖 ,𝑡 +
                                      𝛾Bankloan𝑖 ,𝑡  + 𝜃Control𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡        (1.1)            
Where lnPGDP𝑖 ,𝑡  is the log of GDP per capita of province i in year t. 𝛼𝑖   and 
𝛼𝑡 denote the province fixed effect and time fixed effect, respectively. SOE𝑖,𝑡  
denotes the share of SOEs in province i. Bankloan𝑖,𝑡 is the level of financial 
deepening, measured by the loan to GDP ratio in each province at year t. Control𝑖,𝑡  
include other time-variant controls. 
However, after controlling the province fixed effect 𝛼𝑖 , the lagged dependent 
variable lnPGDP𝑖,𝑡  is correlated with error term 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡  , leading to endogeneity. To 
solve the problem, I introduce the dynamic panel model (GMM) which takes the 
first difference for each variable to get rid of province fixed effect: 
𝑦𝑖 ,𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖 ,𝑡−1 = 𝛼𝑡 − 𝛼𝑡−1 + 𝛼 𝑦𝑖 ,𝑡−1 − 𝑦𝑖 ,𝑡−2 + 𝛽 X𝑖,𝑡−1 − X𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡 −  𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 
However, there is a new problem since 𝑦𝑖 ,𝑡−1is correlated with 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡−1. To address 
the endogeneity, I use the lags of the endogenous variables as instruments if the 
following moment conditions are satisfied. 
𝐸 𝑦𝑖 ,𝑡−𝑠 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡 −  𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡−1  = 0 
𝐸 𝑋𝑖 ,𝑡−𝑠 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡 −  𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡−1  = 0 
Where s >= 2. 
Although the financial system is dominated by the banking sector in China, equity 
financing also plays a significant role in boosting economic growth (Hasan, 
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Wachtel and Zhou (2009)).  Therefore, I take the ratio of equity issuance to GDP 
as a measure of financial development and further test the impact of equity 
financing on income growth in China. The equity issuance data are released by 
the People's Bank of China. I collect the value of equity issuance of Non-financial 
corporations from China Regional Financial Performance Report and then divide 
it by the GDP in each province. The ratio captures the development of equity 
market in China, which is much different from banking sector since bank loans 
usually mature in two years in China and thereby lead to bankruptcy risk that can 
be avoided by equity financing. 
∆lnPGDP𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼lnPGDP𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1SOE𝑖,𝑡Bankloan𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛾1Bankloan𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽2SOE𝑖,𝑡Equity𝑖 ,𝑡+  𝛾2Equity𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝜆SOE𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝜃Control𝑖 ,𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡                                  (1.2)   
Where Equity𝑖 ,𝑡denotes the equity issuance to GDP ratio in province i at year t. 
1.3.2 SOEs, Firm Innovation and Financial Deepening 
To investigate, especially for SOEs, the channel through which the financial 
deepening affects economic growth in China, I manually collect the annual 
domestic grants for patents of each province from the state intellectual property 
office of the P.R.C and develop the following regression: 
∆lnPatents𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1SOE𝑖,𝑡Bankloan𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛾1Bankloan𝑖,𝑡      
+ 𝛽2SOE𝑖,𝑡Equity𝑖,𝑡+  𝛾2Equity𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆SOE𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃Control𝑖 ,𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡                                                                                  (1.3)  
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The dependent variable is the annual growth rate of the domestic grants for 
patents of province i in year t. 𝛼𝑖and 𝛼𝑡denote the province fixed effect and time 
fixed effect, respectively. SOE𝑖 ,𝑡 denotes the share of SOEs in province i. 
Bankloan𝑖 ,𝑡   is bank loan to GDP ratio. Equity𝑖 ,𝑡  denotes the equity to GDP ratio. 
Control𝑖 ,𝑡  denotes other time-variant controls including education level, inflation. 
I use GMM estimator to address endogeneity. For robustness, I rerun the model 
with simple OLS estimator. 
To better understand how state ownership amplify the effect of bank loans on 
innovation activities, I collect survey data of more than 2000 private firms, which 
are financially constrained and suffer from the problem of maturity mismatch in 
China from World Bank Enterprise Surveys database to gauge whether the state 
ownership will increase innovation with access to bank loans for private firms. I 
estimate the following model: 
Innovation𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽SOE_private𝑖Bankloan𝑖  + 𝜆SOE_private𝑖     
+ 𝛾Bankloan𝑖  + 𝜃Control𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖          (1.4)   
The dependent variable, Innovation𝑖 , denotes firm innovation. I define three 
innovation variables to measures whether the firm invest in innovation or not. 
1) Innodummy𝑖  is a dummy that values one if the firm introduced any new 
products or services; 2) 𝑅𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖  equals to 1 if the firm spends on research and 
development activities. 3)𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑖  values between 0 to 8, which is  sum of the 
innovation activities conducted by the firm SOE_private𝑖  the share owned by 
government or state. Bankloan𝑖  is a dummy that values 1 if the firm has access to 
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bank loans. Control𝑖  include other control variables such as firm size, age, 
capacity, etc. 
I also conduct empirical analysis on public firms by collecting annual research 
and development expenditure from 2006 to 2013. I combine the firm-level panel 
data with province level macro variables and estimate the following model: 
Innovation𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑘 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1SOE_public𝑖 ,𝑡Bankloan𝑗 ,𝑡 + 𝛾1Bankloan𝑗 ,𝑡
+ 𝛽2SOE_public𝑖,𝑡Equity𝑗 ,𝑡+  𝛾2Equity𝑗 ,𝑡 + 𝜆SOE_public𝑖 ,𝑡
+ 𝜃Control𝑗 ,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡                                                                    (1.5) 
The dependent variable is the log of annual R&D expenditure of firm i in year t. 
𝛼𝑘  and 𝛼𝑡  denote the industry fixed effect and time fixed effect, respectively.  
SOE_public𝑖,𝑡  values 1 if the controlling shareholder of the public firm is the state. 
Bankloan𝑗 ,𝑡  is bank loan to GDP ratio in province j. Equity𝑗 ,𝑡  denotes the equity 
to GDP ratio. Control𝑗 ,𝑡  denotes other time-variant controls. 
1.4 Results 
Table 1.2 presents the results of Eq. (1.1). As shown in the table, the coefficient of 
the interaction term SOE𝑖 ,𝑡Bankloan𝑖 ,𝑡 is positive and significant at 1% level, 
which suggests that lending to SOEs is associated with higher economic growth. 
To be more specific, I find that the finance-growth nexus will increase by 5 
percent when the fraction of State-Owned Enterprises increases by 10 percent. 
The table also suggests that the level of bank financing is negatively associated 
with income growth if the size of the State sector is low. Therefore, my results 
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show that the finance-growth nexus could be either positive or negative across 
different province conditioning on the fraction of state ownership, which explain 
the inconsistent findings between finance development and GDP growth rate in 
prior literature. Consistent with prior literature, the results suggest a negative 
association between state ownership and income growth, indicating a low 
productivity of State sector. 
My results are robust after controlling for education, inflation and year dummies. 
The Hansen test suggests that I cannot reject the orthogonality condition. Besides, 
I also test the second order autocorrelation for the residuals and again demonstrate 
the validity of the instruments. To be more confident with the results, I rerun Eq. 
(1.1) with a simple OLS estimator. The results also reveal a significant positive 
effect of state ownership on the finance-growth nexus. After controlling for 
inflation and education, the results remain significant. Namely, the OLS estimator 
is consistent with the GMM method. 
To further verify my hypothesis that the mismatch between short-term bank loans 
and long-term innovation activities hinder the finance-growth nexus in China, I 
collect equity issuance data of Non-financial corporations for each province and 
take the ratio of equity issuance to GDP as an alternative measure of financial 
development. As shown in table 1.3, the coefficient of the interaction term 
SOE𝑖 ,𝑡Bankloan𝑖 ,𝑡  remains positive and significant after introducing the equity 
financing indicator to the model.  However, compared with the bank loans, equity 
financing has a positive and significant impact on income growth while the 
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marginal effect of the State sector is negative. In other words, income grows with 
the expansion of equity market and grows faster with a larger Non-State sector.  
The results show opposite effects of state ownership on finance-growth nexus, 
depending on equity-based or bank-based financing channels. SOEs promote 
income level with access to bank loans while NSOEs contribute to economic 
growth with the expansion of equity market. To explain such phenomenon and to 
better understand the role of state ownership in finance-growth nexus in China, I 
investigate the channel through which the financial deepening affects economic 
growth in China. I manually collect the annual domestic grants for patents of each 
province in China from the state intellectual property office of the P.R.C. Table 
1.4 shows the impact of the state ownership on finance-innovation association, 
which is consistent with that on the finance-growth nexus. I find a positive 
relation between patents grants and equity financing, which is more evident with a 
large size of Non-State sector. But the effects of bank loans on innovation are 
significant and positive with a high fraction of State sector. The results comply 
with my mismatch story that short-term bank loan brings about liquidity risk that 
suppresses the long-term innovation activities. Such conflicts could be alleviated 
by the state ownership since SOEs can easily obtain new loans to pay the old ones 
under government guarantees while NSOEs may face a liquidity crunch and keep 
the loans as precautionary savings. However, financing from equity market avoid 




I further use firm-level data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys database to 
gauge whether the state ownership can alleviate the problem of maturity 
mismatch. As shown in table 1.5, the fraction of the state-owned shares is 
negatively associated with my innovation indicator while the coefficient of the 
interaction term is positive. Therefore, the results suggest that, although 
unconditionally, SOEs are less likely to innovate, they do invest more in 
innovation and research activities if they have access to bank loans. Namely, 
although SOEs are less productive, lending to SOEs is still efficient since the 
marginal effect of bank loans is higher for SOEs. Therefore, the survey data of 
private firms also provide evidence that consistent with my story. I also use 
different measure of innovation such as innovation dummy, research dummy and 
total innovation to verify the robustness of our model and the results are quite 
similar. 
Table 1.6 presents the impact of financial deepening on public firms and the role 
of state ownership. As public firms can easily refinance their loans by equity 
issuance, they do not suffer from the problem of maturity mismatch. Namely, 
compared with private firms, the Non-State-Owned public firms are more willing 
to invest in long-term projects with short-term loans. The empirical evidence is 
consistent with this argument. I find that the marginal effect of the financial 
deepening on the firm innovation is positive for Non-State-Owned public firms 
and the results are significant for both bank financing and equity financing. The 
evidence suggests that if NSOEs can get rid of the problem of maturity mismatch, 
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lending to these firms will promote economic growth since these productive 
NSOEs are willing to allocate the loans to innovation and research activities. 
1.5 Conclusion 
In this paper, I examine the impact of state ownership on the finance-growth 
nexus in China. Using a sample of 31 provinces from 2004 to 2013, I find that the 
size of bank loans is negatively associated with annual GDP growth rate while the 
marginal effect of the State sector is positive and significant. Namely, the growth 
effect of bank loans is more evident with a larger fraction of SOEs while NSOEs 
contribute to economic growth with the expansion of equity market. The impact 
of the state ownership on finance-innovation association is consistent with that on 
the finance-growth nexus. Based on the World Bank Enterprise Surveys database, 
I also find that, compared with NSOEs, SOEs are more willing to allocate 
resource in R&D sector and technology investment if they have access to bank 
loans. The results imply that lending to SOEs help banks to detect the innovative 
firms and finally promote economic growth in China. 
One potential explanation of the results is the “Big Push” theory. According to the 
theory, the underdeveloped economy requires a high minimum amount of 
investment across its different sectors to overcome trap of vicious circles of 
poverty. Therefore, the Chinese government makes great amount of investment in 
the State sector, which require the support from the banks. Although the “Big 
Push” theory explain why the banks prefer to SOEs, it is still interesting to ask 
 19 
 
why NSOEs, which are more productive but financially constrained, are less 
likely to innovate with bank loans. 
The key to understand the results is the mismatch of maturity between short-term 
loans and long-term projects such as innovation and R&D expenditure. In China, 
bank loans are usually matured in two years while the innovation and research 
activities require long-term investment and may not able to provide cash flows in 
the short-term, leading to high risk of bankruptcy if the firms cannot get new 
loans to repay the old one. Such situation may not happen in a frictionless market, 
but it is indeed a big problem in China where the monetary policy changes both 
dramatically and frequently. For example, to boost the economy after 2008 global 
crisis, Chinese government announced the so-called "4 trillion yuan stimulus 
package" and commercial banks grant massive credit to both SOEs and NSOEs. 
However, due to the high inflation rate, the central bank of China decided to 
tighten money supply in 2010 when many NSOEs fail to get new loans to repay 
the old one. But the SOEs suffer less from the problem since they can easily get 
support from government and avoid the bankruptcy risks. 
Namely, when the central bank reduces the money supply, the commercial banks 
in China will support the SOEs first while the NSOEs may face a liquidity crunch. 
Therefore, when NSOEs get the loans from banks, they may not invest in long-
term project but instead keep that money as precautionary savings. This 
explanation is consistent with my findings that NSOEs are less likely to innovate 
with access to bank credit. 
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Recently, to maintain the high-income growth, Chinese government implements 
several policies to encourage commercial banks to grant loans to NSOEs. 
However, based on my findings, simply lending to NSOEs does not solve the 
problem since the NSOEs are not willing to utilize the short-term loans regarding 
the liquidity risk. My result also suggests that financing from equity market can 
avoid the mismatch problem and thereby allow NSOEs to invest in research and 
innovation activities. Therefore, to boost the economy, Chinese government 
should develop the public debt and stock market since the access to long-term 
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Figure 1.1 Proportion of Short-term Loans of Banks in China 
This figure presents the proportion of short-term loans of the "big four" state-owned commercial 





Figure 1.2 Debt Maturity in China’s Bond Market 
This figure shows the proportion of debt issued in China’s bond market. I collect the debt issuance 
data in 2015 and divide the data into 11 groups by maturity. There are two bond market in China, 
exchange bond market and interbank bond market. Banks are not allowed to trade in the exchange 
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Table 1.1 Summary Statistics 
Panel A presents the summary statistics of the provincial level data. Lnpgdp is the log of GDP per 
capita of province i in year t. Lnpatents is the annual growth rate of the domestic grants for patents. 
Soe denotes the share of SOEs in province i, which is measured by the number of industrial state 
control enterprise divided by the total number of industrial enterprise. Bankloan is the the bank 
loan to GDP ratio in each province. Equity is the equity issuance to GDP ratio. Cpi denotes the 
annual inflation rate while Edu is the level of education measured by the number of people with 
bachelor degree divided by the total population for each province. Panel B presents the summary 
statistics of the firm-level data. Innodummy is a dummy that values one if the firm introduced any 
new products or services. Rddummy equals to 1 if the firm spend on research and development 
activities. TotalInn values between 0 to 8, which is sum of the innovation activities conducted by 
the firm. Bankloan equals to 1 if the firm has a line of credit or a loan from a financial institution. 
Soe_private denotes the share owned by government or state. Age is the year of the survey minus 
the year of establishment. Size takes values between 1 to 3, representing small firms, medium 
firms and large firms, respectively. Establishment is the number of establishments that form the 
firm. Incorporate values 1 if the firm is legally incorporated. Capacity is the output produced as a 
proportion of the maximum output when using all the resources available.  Rd is the log of R&D 
expenditure of the public firms. Soe_public values 1 if the controlling shareholder is the state. 
  
Panel A: Provincial Level Data 
Variable OBS Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Lnpgdp 310 9.90259 0.591562 8.331 11.233 
Lnpatents 310 8.549226 1.717812 3.14 12.51 
Bankloan 310 1.068516 0.373835 0.54 2.58 
Equity 310 0.010968 0.022577 0 0.27 
Soe 310 0.149774 0.126241 0.01 0.87 
Cpi 310 1.032419 0.020581 0.98 1.1 
Edu 310 0.040887 0.0108 0.015 0.062 
Panel B: Firm-Level Data 
Variable OBS Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Innodummy 2839 0.464248 0.498808 0 1 
Rddummy 1714 0.417153 0.493233 0 1 
TotalInn 1700 4.709412 2.796034 0 8 
Bankloan 2732 0.312592 0.463634 0 1 
Soe_private 2838 6.789288 24.03647 0 100 
Age 2767 13.10119 8.870313 0 133 
Size 2848 2.196278 0.765263 1 3 
Establishment 2847 2.462943 5.989386 1 90 
Incorporate 2848 0.069523 0.254385 0 1 
Capacity 1691 86.79657 10.76467 0 100 
Rd                  8150 1.786039   1.933143 .0000452 40.9575 
Soe_public 8150 0.400859 0.490103  0           1 
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Table 1.2 Bank Deepening, Economic Growth and State Ownership 
The table presents the impact of state ownership on the finance-growth nexus in China. 
∆lnPGDP𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼lnPGDP𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝛽SOE𝑖,𝑡 ∗ Bankloan𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾Bankloan𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜆SOE𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃Control𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡  
The dependent variable is the annual growth rate of GDP per capita of province i in year t. 𝛼𝑖  and 
𝛼𝑡denote the province fixed effect and time fixed effect, respectively. lnPGDP𝑖,𝑡 is the lagged 
level of GDP per capita. SOE𝑖,𝑡denotes the share of SOEs in province i. Bankloan𝑖,𝑡 is the level 
of financial deepening measured by the bank loan to GDP ratio. Control𝑖,𝑡denotes other time-
variant controls including education level, inflation rate. I use GMM estimator to address 
endogeneity. For robustness, I rerun the model with simple OLS estimator. 
VARIABLES GMM OLS 
       
Bankloan*Soe 0.139*** 0.219*** 0.156* 0.189*** 0.148*** 0.144** 
 (0.0523) (0.0657) (0.0866) (0.0586) (0.0567) (0.0568) 
Bankloan -0.0101 -0.0228 -0.0337 -0.064*** -0.0411*** -0.040*** 
 (0.0181) (0.0167) (0.0253) (0.0108) (0.0113) (0.0114) 
Soe -0.52*** -0.46*** -0.43*** -0.145** -0.141** -0.138** 
 (0.133) (0.151) (0.148) (0.0579) (0.0554) (0.0556) 
L.inpgdp -0.14*** -0.075*** -0.095**    
 (0.0437) (0.0258) (0.0385)    
Edu  0.555 0.224  1.267*** 1.269*** 
  (1.057) (0.880)  (0.237) (0.237) 
Cpi   -0.824**   0.103 
   (0.390)   (0.104) 
Constant 1.588*** 0.858*** 1.931** 0.170*** 0.0998*** -0.00769 
 (0.462) (0.283) (0.754) (0.0112) (0.0170) (0.110) 
Year Dummy YES YES YES NO NO NO 
       
Observations 279 279 279 310 310 310 
Hansen Test 1.000 1.000 0.998    
Arellano-Bond  0.146 0.160 0.262    





Table 1.3 Equity Deepening, Economic Growth and State Ownership 
The table presents the impact of state ownership on the finance-growth nexus in China. 
∆lnPGDP𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼lnPGDP𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1SOE𝑖,𝑡 ∗ Bankloan𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾1Bankloan𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽2SOE𝑖,𝑡 ∗ Equity𝑖,𝑡+  𝛾2Equity𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆SOE𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃Control𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡  
The dependent variable is the annual growth rate of GDP per capita of province i in year t.𝛼𝑖  
and 𝛼𝑡   denote the province fixed effect and time fixed effect, respectively. lnPGDP𝑖,𝑡  is the 
lagged level of GDP per capita. SOE𝑖,𝑡  denotes the share of SOEs in province i. Bankloan𝑖,𝑡  is 
bank loan to GDP ratio. Equity𝑖,𝑡  denotes the equity to GDP ratio. Control𝑖,𝑡  denotes other time-
variant controls including education level, inflation rate. I use GMM estimator to address 
endogeneity. For robustness, I rerun the model with simple OLS estimator. 
VARIABLES GMM OLS 
       
Bankloan*Soe 0.222** 0.209* 0.166* 0.214*** 0.175*** 0.171*** 
 (0.0906) (0.112) (0.0914) (0.0594) (0.0573) (0.0575) 
Bankloan -0.0446 -0.0418 -0.0265 -0.073*** -0.0505*** -0.0490*** 
 (0.0273) (0.0267) (0.0207) (0.0116) (0.0118) (0.0120) 
Equity*Soe -2.118 -2.129 -1.565 -2.401** -2.503** -2.486** 
 (1.409) (1.685) (1.832) (1.132) (1.082) (1.082) 
Equity 0.455* 0.461* 0.320 0.535** 0.590** 0.580** 
 (0.236) (0.275) (0.285) (0.244) (0.234) (0.234) 
Soe -0.513*** -0.491*** -0.407** -0.151*** -0.148*** -0.145*** 
 (0.142) (0.139) (0.199) (0.0578) (0.0552) (0.0553) 
L.inpgdp -0.135*** -0.137*** -0.123**    
 (0.0425) (0.0464) (0.0595)    
Edu  -0.350 -0.278  1.292*** 1.292*** 
  (1.068) (1.497)  (0.236) (0.236) 
Cpi   -0.987   0.0913 
   (0.967)   (0.103) 
Year Dummy YES YES YES NO NO NO 
Constant 1.519*** 1.552*** 2.398* 0.175*** 0.103*** 0.00774 
 (0.462) (0.517) (1.373) (0.0114) (0.0170) (0.110) 
       
Observations 279 279 279 310 310 310 
Hansen Test 1.000 1.000 1.000    
Arellano-Bond  0.048 0.046 0.148    





Table 1.4 Financial Deepening, Innovation and State Ownership 
The table presents the impact of state ownership on the finance-growth nexus in China. 
∆lnPatents𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1SOE𝑖,𝑡 ∗ Bankloan𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾1Bankloan𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2SOE𝑖,𝑡
∗ Equity𝑖,𝑡+  𝛾2Equity𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆SOE𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃Control𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡  
The dependent variable is the annual growth rate of the domestic grants for patents of province i in 
year t.𝛼𝑖and𝛼𝑡   denote the province fixed effect and time fixed effect, respectively. 
SOE𝑖,𝑡  denotes the share of SOEs in province i. Bankloan𝑖,𝑡  is bank loan to GDP ratio. 
Equity𝑖,𝑡  denotes the equity to GDP ratio. Control𝑖,𝑡  denotes other time-variant controls 
including education level, inflation. I use GMM estimator to address endogeneity. For robustness, 
I rerun the model with simple OLS estimator. 
VARIABLES GMM OLS 
       
Bankloan*Soe 0.850 2.275* 2.874** 1.313* 1.228* 1.277* 
 (1.534) (1.356) (1.379) (0.720) (0.724) (0.727) 
Bankloan 0.249 -0.172 -0.424 -0.167 -0.116 -0.132 
 (0.490) (0.462) (0.482) (0.131) (0.138) (0.140) 
Equity*Soe -91.53*** -108.1*** -119.5*** -77.71*** -77.62*** -77.75*** 
 (10.53) (8.870) (12.28) (12.36) (12.36) (12.37) 
Equity 11.59*** 16.15*** 20.15*** 11.63*** 11.70*** 11.79*** 
 (2.465) (2.390) (3.955) (2.646) (2.646) (2.650) 
Soe -0.389 -1.621 -2.297* -0.965 -0.981 -1.023 
 (1.216) (1.299) (1.358) (0.688) (0.688) (0.691) 
Edu  2.028 7.653  3.072 3.005 
  (7.288) (8.260)  (2.772) (2.776) 
Cpi   4.663   -0.858 
   (4.274)   (1.164) 
Year Dummy YES YES YES NO NO NO 
Constant 1.519*** 1.552*** 2.398* 0.175*** 0.103*** 0.00774 
 (0.462) (0.517) (1.373) (0.0114) (0.0170) (0.110) 
       
Observations 279 279 279 310 310 310 
Hansen Test 1.000 1.000 1.000    
Arellano-Bond  0.843 0.959 0.900    
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.5 Financial deepening, Innovation and State Ownership: Private Firms 
The table presents the impact of financial deepening on firm innovation.  
Innovation𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽SOE𝑖Bankloan𝑖  + 𝜆SOE𝑖 + 𝛾Bankloan𝑖  + 𝜃Control𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  
I define three innovation variables to measures whether the firm invest in innovation or not. 
1)InnovationDummy is a dummy that values one if the firm introduced any new products or 
services; 2)ResearchDummy equals to 1 if the firm spend on research and development activities. 
3)TotalInnovation values between 0 to 8, which is sum of the innovation activities conducted by 
the firm. SOE𝑖 takes the value of 1 if the firm is state-owned. Bankloan𝑖 is a dummy that values 1 
if the firm has access to bank loans.Control𝑖include other control variables such as firm size, age, 
capacity, etc. 
Variable innodummy rddummy TotalInn 
       
Bankloan*Soe 0.00779** 0.0207*** 0.0187*** 0.0216*** 0.0395*** 0.0294** 
 (0.00386) (0.00691) (0.00696) (0.00753) (0.0127) (0.0121) 
Bankloan 0.543*** 0.277** 0.880*** 0.737*** 0.751*** 0.478** 
 (0.0866) (0.113) (0.109) (0.115) (0.206) (0.205) 
Soe -0.0106*** -0.0180*** -0.0108*** -0.0135*** -0.0196*** -0.0213*** 
 (0.00216) (0.00389) (0.00356) (0.00372) (0.00515) (0.00506) 
Age  -0.00229  0.00515  0.0128 
  (0.00654)  (0.00644)  (0.0112) 
Size  0.376***  0.430***  1.037*** 
  (0.0799)  (0.0831)  (0.140) 
Establishment  0.0197*  0.0308**  0.0682*** 
  (0.0118)  (0.0122)  (0.0214) 
Incorporate  0.0816  -0.409*  1.807*** 
  (0.207)  (0.217)  (0.398) 
Capacity  0.00334  0.00394  0.0267*** 
  (0.00480)  (0.00504)  (0.00864) 
Constant -0.280*** -1.390*** -0.629*** -1.992*** 5.156*** 0.0342 
 (0.0488) (0.446) (0.0658) (0.471) (0.123) (0.797) 
       
Observations 2,718 1,587 1,656 1,584 1,640 1,569 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.6Financial deepening, Innovation and State ownership: Public Firms 
The table presents the impact of financial deepening on the innovation of public firms.  
Innovation𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑘 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1SOEpublic 𝑖,𝑡Bankloan𝑗 ,𝑡 + 𝛾1Bankloan𝑗 ,𝑡
+ 𝛽2SOEpublic 𝑖,𝑡Equity𝑗 ,𝑡+  𝛾2Equity𝑗 ,𝑡 + 𝜆SOEpublic 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃Control𝑗 ,𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡  
The dependent variable is the log of annual R&D expenditure of firm i in year t. 𝛼𝑘  and 𝛼𝑡   
denote the industry fixed effect and time fixed effect, respectively.  SOEpublic 𝑖,𝑡
values 1 if the 
controlling shareholder of the public firm is the state.Bankloan𝑗 ,𝑡 is bank loan to GDP ratio. 
Equity𝑗 ,𝑡denotes the equity to GDP ratio.Control𝑗 ,𝑡denotes other time-variant controls. 
VARIABLES R&D Expenditure 
Bankloan*SOE_public -0.598*** -0.599*** -0.345*** -0.327*** 
 (0.0928) (0.0927) (0.0860) (0.0855) 
Bankloan 0.883*** 0.791*** 0.459*** 0.472*** 
 (0.0625) (0.0732) (0.0687) (0.0686) 
Equity*SOE_public -6.248*** -6.726*** -3.027* -5.613*** 
 (1.859) (1.862) (1.713) (1.723) 
Equity 3.376** 3.809*** -0.400 4.618*** 
 (1.458) (1.462) (1.348) (1.473) 
SOE_public 0.157 0.170 -0.0258 0.0624 
 (0.116) (0.116) (0.108) (0.108) 
Edu  -5.220** -8.246*** 2.126 
  (2.600) (2.424) (2.550) 
Cpi  -4.320*** -3.541*** -11.01*** 
  (1.152) (1.057) (3.801) 
Constant 0.889*** 5.629*** 4.768*** 10.85*** 
 (0.0785) (1.205) (1.116) (3.850) 
Industry Fixed Effect NO NO YES YES 
Year Fixed Effect NO NO NO YES 
     
Observations 8,150 8,150 8,147 8,147 
R-squared 0.069 0.071 0.222 0.240 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Chapter 2: Funding Liquidity and Market Liquidity: Evidence from a 
Natural Experiment in China 
2.1 Introduction 
There is extensive literature that investigates the impact and determinants of 
market liquidity. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) find that stock returns are 
positively associated with illiquidity cost measured by relative bid-ask spreads. 
Datar, Naik and Radcliffe (1998) provide an alternative measure of liquidity, the 
turnover rate, and find positive and significant illiquidity return premium. Using 
data from 45 countries, Amihud et al. (2015) conclude that illiquidity plays an 
important role in explaining excess stock return. Their results are robust after 
controlling for risk factors as well as firm characteristics. Researchers also 
provide evidence that volatility of stocks, which brings about high inventory risk 
and adverse selection risk, reduces the level of market liquidity (Stoll (1978), Ho 
and Stoll (1981), Stoll (2000)). Chan, Hameed and Kang (2013) show a positive 
association between stock return co-movement and liquidity. 
In recent studies, much attention has been paid to the links between funding 
liquidity and market liquidity. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) develop a 
theoretical model showing that a decline in traders' funding liquidity (the ability 
and access to funds) will reduce market liquidity (the ease of trading a security). 
The theory also predicts that the commonality in liquidity, which measures the 
comovement of liquidity of the stocks, would increase with shocks to funding 
liquidity. Consistent with the theory, Hameed, Kang and Viswanathan (2010) 
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document that market downturns decrease the liquidity of underlying stocks and 
such positive association between market liquidity and funding liquidity are more 
evident during times of tightness in the funding market. Using an international 
setting, Karolyi, Lee and Van Dijk (2012) show that high market volatility, sharp 
market declines and large fraction of foreign investors lead to high commonality 
in stock liquidity. 
Although many efforts have been made to investigate the links between funding 
liquidity and market liquidity, most of the research does not clear identify the 
impact of funding liquidity and thereby suffer from endogeneity. Therefore, in 
this paper, I take advantage of a recent event in Chinese stock market to directly 
gauge the causal effect of funding liquidity on market liquidity. To be more 
specific, I find that, after the restriction of Off-market margin trading, the stocks 
that are not included in the official margin trading list experience a larger decline 
in market liquidity. I find similar results within the Growth Enterprise Market 
(GEM) which attract most of the positions of investors trading with Off-market 
margin. To gauge the impact of capital shocks on commonality in market liquidity, 
I calculate the market-level illiquidity for both Off-market and official margin 
trading stocks and find that the commonality in liquidity within the Off-market 
margin stocks increases with the negative shocks to Off-market margin trading, 
while the change of commonality in liquidity within the official margin trading 
stocks is insignificant. 
My research contributes to the extant literature in two ways. First, I introduce a 
nature experiment that directly measures the shocks to funding liquidity and 
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thereby provide more convincing evidence of the causal effect on market liquidity. 
Second, my research also contributes to the literature of commonality in liquidity 
by illustrating that the commonality in stock liquidity will increase when capital is 
scarce. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2.2, I review the 
development of margin trading in China and provide details of the natural 
experiment I used for my empirical analysis. Section 2.3 presents the data. The 
impact of funding liquidity on market liquidity is explored in Section 2.4. Section 
2.5 documents the association between capital shocks and commonality in stock 
liquidity. I conclude in Section 2.6. 
2.2 Margin Trading in China 
In China, investors were not allowed to use leverage prior to 2010 when China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) decides to promote margin trading 
business. At the beginning, investors can only trade 90 stocks with margin debt 
while the number of stocks on the official margin trading list expands to 869 in 
2015 since the CSRC still want to control the risk of margin trading. 
Corresponding with the stock market boom, the total margin position grows 
rapidly since Sep. 2014. As shown in figure 2.1, the officially sanctioned margin 
balance outstanding in China increase from 500 billion yuan to 2 trillion yuan in 9 
months. 
With the rapid growth of the stock prices, more and more individual retail 
investors rush into the market. To amplify the stock returns, a lot of investors 
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borrow from brokerage firms that offer margin trading. However, according to the 
restrictions of CSRC, only 869 stocks are available to investors through officially 
sanctioned margin trading while the total number of listed firms is greater than 
2000. But investors can still use margin debt to buy stocks not included in the 
official list via so-called Off-market margin trading, which is highly risky and 
lack of regulation. Such Off-market margin trading business ran out of control 
with the stock market bubble. The leverage increase so fast and CSRC decide to 
restrict the Off-market margin transactions starting from mid-April, 2015.  
Actually, CSRC announced on April 17 that all the security companies are not 
allowed to participate in the Off-market margin trading business. On May 21, 
CSRC required the security companies to stop providing the HOMS (Hundsun 
Order Management System) service for the margin trading business. On June 12, 
the ChangJiang Security Company claimed that all the communication interfaces 
of the HOMS is closed. On July 16, Hundsun Technologies Inc. said it will stop 
opening new accounts on its trading system. 
If investors trade more with the stocks not available on the officially sanctioned 
margin list through the Off-market margin trading, the market liquidity of these 
stocks should experience a larger decline with the limitation of Off-market margin 
transactions. 
Hypothesis 1: The market liquidity of stocks not available on the officially 
sanctioned margin list will experience a larger decline with the limitation of Off-
market margin transactions. 
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Basically, the assumption of H1 is that, in the Off-market, investors will trade 
more with the stocks not included in the officially sanctioned margin trading list. 
However, one can argue that investors may not trade all stocks that are not on the 
official list but instead buy some specific stocks with Off-market margin debt. 
Actually, the Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) attracts a lot of individual retail 
investors in China. GEM is a stock market initiated in 2009 by CSRC for growth 
companies that do not fulfill the requirements of the main board. As shown in 
figure 2.2, GEM index increase from 900 and peaks at 4000 in June 2015 with a 
price-earnings ratio of 137, attracting a lot of speculators as well as Off-market 
margin debt. If investors trade more with the stocks listed on GEM through the 
Off-market margin trading, I would expect a larger decline of market liquidity of 
the GEM stocks. 
Hypothesis 2.1: The market liquidity of GEM stocks will experience a larger 
decline with the limitation of Off-market margin transactions. 
Hypothesis 2.2: The market liquidity of GEM stocks that are not available on the 
officially sanctioned margin list will experience a larger decline with the 
limitation of Off-market margin transactions. 
According to Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), a decline in funding liquidity 
will increase commonality in market liquidity. Hence, with the negative shocks to 
Off-market margin trading business, the commonality in liquidity within the Off-
market margin stocks should increase more than the commonality in liquidity 
within the officially sanctioned margin stocks. 
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Hypothesis 3: With the limitation of Off-market margin transactions, the 
commonality of liquidity across assets increases more for stocks that are not 
available on the officially sanctioned margin list. 
2.3 Data 
To investigate the impact of funding liquidity on market liquidity, I collect 
monthly firm-level data from China Stock Market Accounting Research 











Where 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑞𝑖 ,𝑡  directly reflects the price impact of trading of each individual stock. 
𝑅𝑖 ,𝑑 ,𝑡  denotes the daily stock return and 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖 ,𝑑 ,𝑡  is the trading volume in 1 million 
RMB yuan on day d in month t. N𝑖 ,𝑡  is the number of trading days for stock i in 
month t. 
 Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics of variables. Illq is the Amihud 
illiquidity of individual stocks. Size is the the log of firm's market capitalization. 
Std is the monthly standard deviation of return for each individual stock. Stdmis 
the monthly standard deviation of market return. Turnover is the turnover ratio for 
each stock. Nmargin is a dummy that values one if the stock is not on the official 
margin trading list. Gem is equal to one if the stock is listed on the GEM (Growth 
Enterprise Market) and zero otherwise. Panel B presents the market illiquidity by 
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month. Illq m is obtained by averaging the firm-level Amihud illiquidity. 
IllqNm is the mean illiquidity of the stocks that are not on the official margin 
trading list. IllqGem is the average of illiquidity for Growth Enterprise Market. 
As shown in figure 2.3, market illiquidity increases after April 2015, when CSRC 
decides to restrict Off-market margin trading. The change of illiquidity is more 
evident for GEM stocks and for stocks that are not on the official margin trading 
list, where the impact of funding liquidity is more pronounced. 
2.4 Market Liquidity and Restrictions on Margin Trading 
To test the hypothesis that market liquidity is positively associated with the 
funding liquidity. I develop the following regression: 
𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑞𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽Shock𝑡Nmargin𝑖 + 𝛾1Shock𝑡 + 𝛾2Nmargin𝑖 + 𝜆 Controls𝑖 ,𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡  (2.1)  
The dependent variable is the Amihud illiquidity of each stock. Shock𝑡  is equal to 
1 if the trading month is May or June.Nmargin𝑖  is a dummy that values one if the 
stock is not on the official margin trading list. Shock𝑡Nmargin𝑖  is the interaction 
term between these two dummies.  Controls𝑖 ,𝑡 are the control variables including 
the monthly standard deviation of return for each individual stock, the monthly 
standard deviation of market return, the log of firm's market capitalization and the 
turnover ratio for each stock. 
If the market liquidity of stocks not available on the officially sanctioned margin 
list experiences a larger decline with the shock, the coefficient of the interaction 
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term  Shock𝑡Nmargin𝑖  should be positive. Table 2.2 presents the regression 
results. In Model 1, I find a positive association between Shock𝑡Nmargin𝑖  and 
market illiquidity. Then I calculate the standard deviation of monthly returns for 
both market and individual stock to control for the effect of volatility. The value 
of 𝛽 decreases but remains significant in model 2 and the results are consistent 
after adding turnover rate and firm size, indicating that the negative shocks to 
margin debt reduce the market liquidity. 
To test hypothesis 2.1, I amend Eq. (2.l) by replacing the treatment group with 
GEM stocks. 
𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑞𝑖 ,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽Shock𝑡Gem𝑖 + 𝛾1Shock𝑡 + 𝛾2Gem𝑖 + 𝜆 Controls𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡      (2.2) 
Shock𝑡  equals to 1 if the trading month is May or June. Gem𝑖  equals to one if the 
stock is listed on the GEM (Growth Enterprise Market) and zero otherwise. 
Shock𝑡Gem𝑖 is the interaction term between these two dummies. Other control 
variables are the same as those in Eq. (2.l). 
The results are similar to those presented in table 2.2. As shown in table 2.3, 𝛽 is 
positive and significant across all the four models, suggesting a causal effect of 
funding liquidity to market liquidity. To test hypothesis 2.2, I further use the 
subsample that only contains the stocks that are traded on Growth Enterprise 
Market (GEM) and verify the impact of funding liquidity within the Growth 
Enterprise Market. I reran Eq. (2.1) with GEM stocks and the results in table 2.4 
are consistent with my hypothesis that even within the GEM, stocks that are not 
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included in the official margin trading list experience a larger decline in market 
liquidity. 
2.5 Commonality in Stock liquidity 
To understand how the exogenous shock to margin debt affects commonality in 
stock liquidity, I calculate the mean illiquidity of stocks included in the official 
margin trading list and of those not on the list. Then I estimate the following 
regressions: 
𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑞𝑖 ,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽Shock𝑡𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑞Om𝑖 + 𝛾1Shock𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑞Om𝑖 + 𝜆 Controls𝑖 ,𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡            (2.3) 
𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑞𝑖 ,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽Shock𝑡𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑞Nm𝑖 + 𝛾1Shock𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑞Nm𝑖 + 𝜆 Controls𝑖 ,𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡            (2.4) 
The dependent variable is the Amihud illiquidity of each stock. Shock𝑡  is equal to 
1 if the trading month is May or June. 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑞Om𝑖  is obtained by averaging the 
Amihud illiquidity of firms on the official margin trading list. 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑞Nm𝑖  is the 
mean illiquidity of the stocks that are not on the official margin trading 
list.Shock𝑡𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑞Om𝑖  and Shock𝑡𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑞Nm𝑖  are the interaction terms between these 
two dummies. I use the same control variables as mentioned in Table 2.4. 
Table 2.5 presents the impact of funding liquidity shock to Off-market margin 
trading on commonality in market liquidity. The coefficient of Shock𝑡𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑞Nm𝑖  
suggests a more evident comovement of liquidity of stocks that are not on the 
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officially sanctioned margin list during the shock period while the 𝛽  is 
insignificant for official margin stocks, which is consistent with my hypothesis. 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this paper, I examine the impact of funding liquidity on market liquidity. To 
directly gauge the causal effect of capital shocks, I take advantage of an event in 
Chinese stock market in April 2015 when CSRC decides to restrict Off-market 
margin trading and thereby lead to an exogenous decline in funding liquidity. 
I find that, after the restriction of Off-market margin trading, the stocks that are 
not included in the official margin trading list experience larger decline in market 
liquidity. I find similar results within the Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) which 
attract most of the positions of investors trading with Off-market margin. To 
gauge the impact of capital shocks on commonality in market liquidity, I calculate 
the market-level illiquidity for both Off-market and official margin trading stocks. 
I find that the restriction of Off-market margin trading also lead to a higher 
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Figure 2.1 Margin Trading and Stock Return in China 





Figure 2.2 GEM(Growth Enterprise Market) in China 








Figure 2.3 Market liquidity and Margin Trading 
Illqm is obtained by averaging the ﬁrm-level Amihud illiquidity. IllqNm is the mean illiquidity of 
the stocks that are not on the official margin trading list. IllqGem is the average of illiquidity for 








Table 2.1 Summary Statistics 
Panel A presents the summary statistics of variables. Panel B presents the market illiquidity by 
month. Illq is the Amihud illiquidity of individual stocks. Size is the log of ﬁrm’s market 
capitalization. Std is the monthly standard deviation of return for each individual stock. Stdm is 
the monthly standard deviation of market return. Turnover is the turnover ratio for each stock. 
Nmargin is a dummy that values one if the stock is not on the ofﬁcial margin trading list. Gem is 
equal to one if the stock is listed on the GEM(Growth Enterprise Market)and zero otherwise. Illqm 
is obtained by averaging the ﬁrm-level Amihud illiquidity. IllqNm is the mean illiquidity of the 
stocks that are not on the official margin trading list. IllqGem is the average of illiquidity for 
Growth Enterprise Market. 
  
Panel A: Summary statistics 
Variable OBS Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Illq 24300 0.0053614 0.087629 1.21E-06 5.793837 
Size 24300 22.95345 0.9425965 20.94381 28.40489 
Std 24300 0.0467231 0.0398435 0.0000199 5.287406 
Stdm 24300 0.0268858 0.0115857 0.0113862 0.0451215 
Turnover 24300 0.0338472 0.0228988 0.000027 0.2560756 
Nmargin 24300 0.6565844 0.4748585 0 1 
Gem 24300 0.1667078 0.3727225 0 1 
Panel B: Market Illiquidity 
Month Illqm IllqNm IllqGem 
1 0.0030019 0.0045827 0.0108482 
2 0.0011138 0.0016657 0.0021619 
3 0.0037634 0.0057462 0.0121614 
4 0.0091719 0.0139403 0.0412628 
5 0.0177241 0.0268042 0.078179 
6 0.0132252 0.0199247 0.0448883 
7 0.0029675 0.0042284 0.0077669 
8 0.0007699 0.0010147 0.0010726 
9 0.0008934 0.0011407 0.001147 
10 0.0003237 0.0004122 0.0003987 
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Table 2.2 Market Liquidity and Off-market Margin Trading 
The table presents the impact of funding liquidity shock to Off-market margin trading on market 
liquidity. 
𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑞𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽Shock𝑡Nmargin𝑖 + 𝛾1Shock𝑡 + 𝛾2Nmargin𝑖 + 𝜆 Controls𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡  
The dependent variable is the Amihud illiquidity of each stock. Shock𝑡 is equal to 1 if the trading 
month is May or June.Nmargin𝑖 is a dummy that values one if the stock is not on the official 
margin trading list. Shock𝑡Nmargin𝑖 is the interaction term between these two dummies. 
 Controls𝑖 ,𝑡are the control variables including the monthly standard deviation of return for each 
individual stock, the monthly standard deviation of market return, the log of firm's market 
capitalization and the turnover ratio for each stock. 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 
     
ShockNmargin 0.0191*** 0.000302*** 0.000315*** 0.000312*** 
 -0.00293 -0.000109  -0.000109  -0.000108  
Shock 0.000107 -0.000435*** -0.000412*** -0.000391*** 
 -0.00238 -0.000099  -0.000099  -0.000098  
Nmargin 0.00388*** 0.000418*** 0.000223*** 0.000063  
 -0.00132 -0.000052  -0.000061  -0.000063  
Std 
 
0.00362* 0.003100  0.0107*** 
 
 
-0.002010  -0.002010  -0.002130  
L.Std  0.00268*** 0.00278*** 0.00304*** 
  -0.000552  -0.000552  -0.000551  
Stdm  0.0320*** 0.0342*** 0.0383*** 
  -0.004280  -0.004290  -0.004290  
L.Stdm 
 
-0.0197*** -0.0222*** -0.0313*** 
 
 




   -0.000029  -0.000031  
Turnover 
   
-0.0123*** 
    
-0.001160  
Constant 0.000226 -0.000369*** 0.00376*** 0.00675*** 
 -0.00107 -0.000072  -0.000686  -0.000740  
     
Observations 24,300 20927  20927  20927  
R-squared 0.007 0.017  0.019  0.024  





Table 2.3 Market Liquidity and GEM Margin Trading 
The table presents the impact of funding liquidity shock to GEM(Growth Enterprise Market) on 
market liquidity. 
𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑞𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽Shock𝑡Gem𝑖 + 𝛾1Shock𝑡 + 𝛾2Gem𝑖 + 𝜆 Controls𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡  
Shock𝑡equals to 1 if the trading month is May or June. Gem𝑖equals to one if the stock is listed on 
the GEM(Growth Enterprise Market) and zero otherwise. Shock𝑡Gem𝑖 is the interaction term 
between these two dummies. Controls𝑖 ,𝑡are the control variables including the monthly standard 
deviation of return for each individual stock, the monthly standard deviation of market return, the 
log of firm's market capitalization and the turnover ratio for each stock. 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 
     
ShockGem 0.0467*** 0.00159*** 0.00161*** 0.00155*** 
 -0.0037 -0.00014 -0.00014 -0.00014 
Shock 0.00475*** -0.000497*** -0.000462*** -0.000443*** 
 -0.00152 -0.000072  -0.000072  -0.000072  
Gem 0.00813*** 0.000165** 0.000080  0.000021  
 -0.00168 -0.000067  -0.000068  -0.000068  
Std 
 
0.00352* 0.001450  0.00854*** 
 
 
-0.002020  -0.002030  -0.002130  
L.Std  0.00262*** 0.00268*** 0.00290*** 
  -0.000551  -0.000550  -0.000549  
Stdm  0.0321*** 0.0370*** 0.0407*** 
  -0.004280  -0.004300  -0.004300  
L.Stdm 
 
-0.0195*** -0.0231*** -0.0312*** 
 
 




   -0.000024  -0.000025  
Turnover 
   
-0.0116*** 
    
-0.001130  
Constant 0.00143** -0.000125* 0.00543*** 0.00724*** 
 -0.00068 -0.000066  -0.000556  -0.000581  
     
Observations 24,300 20,927 20,927 20,927 
R-squared 0.016 0.021 0.026 0.031 





Table 2.4 Shock to Margin Trading within the Growth Enterprise Market 
The table presents the results using the subsample that only include the stocks that are traded on 
Growth Enterprise Market(GEM). 
𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑞𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽Shock𝑡Nmargin𝑖 + 𝛾1Shock𝑡 + 𝛾2Nmargin𝑖 + 𝜆 Controls𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡  
The dependent variable is the Amihud illiquidity of each stock. Shock𝑡 is equal to 1 if the trading 
month is May or June.Nmargin𝑖 is a dummy that values one if the stock is not on the official 
margin trading list. Shock𝑡Nmargin𝑖 is the interaction term between these two dummies. 
 Controls𝑖 ,𝑡are the control variables including the monthly standard deviation of return for each 
individual stock, the monthly standard deviation of market return, the log of firm's market 
capitalization and the turnover ratio for each stock. 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 
     
ShockNmargin 0.0587** 0.00145** 0.00146** 0.00159** 
 -0.0231 -0.00072 -0.00072 -0.00072 
Shock 0.000153 -0.00039 -0.00028 -0.00043 
 -0.0216 -0.0007 -0.00071 -0.0007 
Nmargin 0.0107 0.000275 -0.00019 -0.000809** 
 -0.0105 -0.00034 -0.00039 -0.00041 
Std 
 
-0.0730*** -0.0693*** -0.0529*** 
 
 
-0.0091 -0.00922 -0.0096 
L.Std  0.124*** 0.126*** 0.130*** 
  -0.00665 -0.00671 -0.00672 
Stdm  0.0637*** 0.0614*** 0.0710*** 
  -0.0184 -0.0185 -0.0184 
L.Stdm 
 
-0.120*** -0.127*** -0.149*** 
 
 




   -0.00018 -0.00019 
Turnover 
   
-0.0324*** 
    
-0.00557 
Constant 0.000192 -0.00064 0.00937** 0.0180*** 
 -0.00979 -0.00045 -0.0042 -0.00443 
     
Observations 4,051 3,430 3,430 3,430 
R-squared 0.014 0.109 0.11 0.119 




Table 2.5 Commonality in Liquidity and Off-market Margin Trading 
The table presents the impact of funding liquidity shock to Off-market margin trading on 
commonality in market liquidity. I estimate the following regressions to investigate the 
commonality in liquidity across Off-market and official margin trading stocks. 
Model 1 and model 2: 
𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑞𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽Shock𝑡𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑞Om𝑖 + 𝛾1Shock𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑞Om𝑖 + 𝜆 Controls𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡  
Model 3 and model 4: 
𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑞𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽Shock𝑡𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑞Nm𝑖 + 𝛾1Shock𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑞Nm𝑖 + 𝜆 Controls𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
The dependent variable is the Amihud illiquidity of each stock. Shock𝑡 is equal to 1 if thetrading 
month is May or June. 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑞Om𝑖is obtained by averaging the Amihud illiquidityof ﬁrms on the 
ofﬁcial margin trading list. 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑞Nm𝑖is the mean illiquidity of the stocksthat are not on the ofﬁcial 
margin trading list. Shock𝑡𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑞Om𝑖andShock𝑡𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑞Nm𝑖  are theinteraction terms between these 
two dummies. I use the same control variables as mentioned in Table 2.4. 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 







ShockIllqOm -0.113 -0.227 
 
 









IllqOm 0.459*** 0.502*** 
 
 
 -0.128 -0.128 
 
 
Shock -0.00014 -0.0000949 -0.00172*** -0.00129*** 
 -0.0000956 -0.000095 -0.0005 -0.0005 
Volatility YES YES YES YES 
Size NO YES NO YES 
Turnover NO YES NO YES 
Constant YES YES YES YES 
     
Observations 7,303 7,303 13,624 13,624 
R-squared 0.04 0.054 0.014 0.024 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
